Source-reviewed components
Ballot cryptography
Exponential ElGamal over Ristretto255, homomorphic addition and threshold-combination code exist. Source presence is not proof of a fully secured election pipeline.
Pre-release · source-reviewed design
Readiness is evidence, not a date.
A clear distinction between SEVA source-reviewed components, integration and testing gaps, and future work without promised release dates.
SEVA is pre-release. This roadmap separates what can be inspected today from what still needs demonstration and what remains planned. None of these stages authorizes a real election or replaces institutional acceptance.
Current readiness
Evidence and limits
Source review confirms that a component exists. It does not establish independent security assurance, completed deployment tests or approval to run an election.
Source-reviewed components
Proof and trustee primitives
Chaum–Pedersen proofs, primitive selection-sum checks and distributed-key-generation components have source tests. These tests were not executed during this website audit.
Source-reviewed components
Eligibility and credential boundaries
Blind credential issuance and spent-nullifier storage are implemented in source. Complete voter identity, reissue and concurrent check-in assurance still requires integration testing.
Source-reviewed components
Explicit lifecycle rules
The core state machine restricts transitions and disallows egress in Open and Paused. Actual session, ceremony and network enforcement must be validated together.
Source-reviewed components
Separated records and audit chains
Role-scoped database grants and hash-linked audit/ballot components support the intended separation of duties. Host trust, custody, logs and recovery remain part of the threat model.
Integration testing required
Independent result verification
The artifact verifier does not yet complete integrated ballot-proof and tally checks. Do not treat a verifier result as complete election assurance.
Integration testing required
Operator identity and key custody
Authentication adapters, signing and hardware-key modules exist, but their full operational integration is unfinished. No universal FIDO2, non-exportable HSM custody or biometric guarantee is claimed.
Integration testing required
Deployment and evidence rehearsals
Hardware lockdown, printing and custody, recovery, integrated mock elections and external review require acceptance evidence. Runbooks and module names are not certification.
Planned or under development
Master and Kiosk product packaging
The two-installed-application direction is proposed. Current source packaging still contains several surfaces and executables; released two-app deployment is not established.
Planned or under development
Additional ballot technologies
Shuffle-based processing and ranked/write-in scenarios remain deferred. A feature flag or roadmap entry does not establish a supported cryptographic protocol or ballot type.
Source-reviewed components
The reviewed source includes encryption and proof primitives, blind credentials, threshold components, hash-linked records and local service controls. Unit-test definitions exist for several primitives. This review did not execute those tests or establish a passing independent release; source presence and verified operation are different evidence levels.
Integration and testing still required
Complete independent ballot-proof and tally verification, durable identity handling and trustee authorization. Demonstrate sealed contest rules, concurrent credential issuance, recovery and authenticated lifecycle operations. Then rehearse with real hardware, paper reconciliation and supervised participants before requesting an independent acceptance decision.
Planned work is not shipped capability
The proposed two-application Master/Kiosk direction still needs a coherent operational integration and acceptance process. Mixnet, ranked and write-in paths remain deferred; feature labels do not prove an implemented alternative curve backend. Future additions require protocol review, test vectors and explicit support decisions before appearing as available services.
Open acceptance gates
External cryptographic and security reviews, representative rehearsals and operational signoffs are readiness requirements. No certification, completed independent audit, election deployment or release date is claimed here. Request an assessment to discuss requirements, evidence and constraints; an assessment is not election approval.
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Scope before commitment
Assessment only. Not yet suitable for any live election. Deployment and operation require authorized SparkGlim Security and Technical Teams.
Country context guides the consultation. It does not establish jurisdictional approval, regulatory compliance or product availability.