Pre-release · source-reviewed design
Separate responsibilities. Review the connections.
Explore SEVA’s intended Master and Kiosk model, local election services, data separation and incomplete verification boundary.
SEVA’s direction is a coordinated Master application and a focused Voting Kiosk, backed by local election services. The repository also contains specialist components from the earlier multi-application model; a proposed structure is not evidence of a completed deployment.
Eligibility and check-in
Authorized roll operations and supervised exceptions. Identity data belongs on this side of the boundary.
Separate responsibilities. Validate the complete path.
Ballot marking and encryption
A paired kiosk presents configured contests. Cryptographic components process selections; integrated assurance remains under evaluation.
Close, reconcile and review
Lifecycle controls, trustee components, paper reconciliation and result artifacts have distinct responsibilities. The independent verifier is incomplete.
Security depends on the complete implementation, trusted operations and reviewed evidence. No certification or independent audit is claimed.
Master and Voting Kiosk
Master is the proposed coordination surface for preparation and authorized operations; Kiosk focuses on the voter-facing ballot session. Operational roles still need their own permissions. Combining screens into one application does not merge trust boundaries or authorize election actions from a public website.
Local services and controlled surfaces
Native services separate configuration, check-in, ballot handling, monitoring, trustees and result packaging. Their gateway has client-certificate and per-surface access components. A newer central administrative adapter serves a different purpose. Each connection needs its own authenticated deployment contract; none is a public browser election API.
Data separation is a deployment responsibility
Separate roll and ballot schemas, restricted database roles and blind-credential components support the intended separation between eligibility and selections. Actual service identities, logs, backup copies and privileged operators must preserve that boundary. The website cannot establish those controls for an institution.
Results cross a verification boundary
Result-package and tabulator code prepare encrypted aggregates and signed artifacts. A separate Go verifier is intended to check published material through an independent implementation. Its complete ballot-proof and tally checks are not yet integrated, so publication is not equivalent to independently verified election results.
Request consultation
Scope before commitment
Assessment only. Not yet suitable for any live election. Deployment and operation require authorized SparkGlim Security and Technical Teams.
Country context guides the consultation. It does not establish jurisdictional approval, regulatory compliance or product availability.