Pre-release · source-reviewed design
Cryptography, with clear boundaries.
Understand SEVA’s implemented ballot-encryption and trustee primitives, and the verification work still required before election use.
SEVA contains cryptographic building blocks for encrypted ballots and a trustee-controlled tally. A working primitive is one part of election assurance; the complete protocol, devices and published artifacts still need independent validation.
Encrypted selections
The source implements exponential ElGamal over Ristretto255. Each ciphertext contains two curve points; points and scalars use 32-byte encodings. Fresh cryptographic randomness encrypts each selection. The encoding length is not a claim of 256-bit security.
Proofs about ballot structure
Chaum–Pedersen proof primitives check binary selection slots and a claimed selection sum. Their Fiat–Shamir transcript uses domain-separated SHA-512. Binding those checks to the correct sealed contest and its permitted selections is additional integration work, not a property to infer from the primitive alone.
A threshold of trustees
Distributed-key components generate polynomial shares, verify commitments and adjudicate complaints. Threshold decryption combines trustee contributions using Lagrange interpolation. The threshold belongs to the election configuration; test examples such as three of five are not a universal deployment setting or proof of hardware custody.
Aggregation before decryption
Homomorphic addition can combine encrypted selection totals before plaintext recovery. The source includes bounded recovery and trustee-combination routines. The application still needs validated proof handling, ceremony integration and representative election tests before this can support an independently verified public tally.
What independent verification still needs
The separate Go artifact verifier does not yet perform complete ballot-proof and tally verification. External cryptographic review, matching Rust/Go test vectors and a fully exercised election workflow remain open. Mixnet and ranked or write-in election paths are not shipping capabilities.
Security depends on the complete implementation, trusted operations and reviewed evidence. No certification or independent audit is claimed.
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Scope before commitment
Assessment only. Not yet suitable for any live election. Deployment and operation require authorized SparkGlim Security and Technical Teams.
Country context guides the consultation. It does not establish jurisdictional approval, regulatory compliance or product availability.